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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GARY LEE MABE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 910444 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992) whereby the Utah Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction over appeals involving a conviction of a first 
degree felony. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment V, due process clause, to the Constitution of the 
United States provides: 
No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . . 
Amendment XIV, due process clause, of the Constitution of 
the United States provides: 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue, Under the totality of circumstances, was the 
confession involuntary and admitted in violation of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution? 
Standard of Review. The determination of whether a 
confession was voluntary involves a question of law which is 
reviewed independently by this Court for correctness. State v. 
Sinaer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah App. 1991); Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). "It is 
the duty of the appellate court . . . 'to examine the entire record 
and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of 
voluntariness.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341, 348, 96 
S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated January 9, 1991, the State charged 
Gary Mabe with Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony. 
R. 8-9. 
On May 20, 1991, the district court heard Mr. Mabe's Motion 
to Suppress statements made to Detectives Chuck Oliver and John 
Johnson on January 7, 1991 on the basis that they were involuntarily 
made, in violation of his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights. 
R. 36, 37; see Addendum A for copy of Defendant's memorandum in 
support of his Motion to Suppress. Following an evidentiary hearing 
and submission of memoranda by counsel, the district court denied 
- 2 -
the motion. R. 64, 65, 66, 70. See Addendum B for copy of 
"Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law." 
On June 24, 1991, Mr. Mabe entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to second degree murder; he explicitly preserved his right to 
appeal the trial judge's ruling on the suppression motion. State v. 
Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). R. 71, 94 p.3. 
The trial judge sentenced Mr. Mabe to a term of five years to life 
at the Utah State Prison. R. 9. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of December 5, 1990, the body of 
Carol Mabe, Appellant's wife, was discovered at her place of 
employment, Timesaver Industrial, Inc., by a fellow employee. R. 9. 
On January 4, 1991, approximately one month after Carol 
Mabe's death, Mr. Mabe reported to the police station in the Public 
Safety Building in downtown Salt Lake City at 1:30 p.m. to answer 
questions concerning Carol Mabe's death. Tr.l p. 68.! When 
Mr. Mabe arrived at the Public Safety Building, he was placed in a 
small interrogation room, where he sat at the end of the table 
farthest from the door. A detective was seated adjacent to him on 
each side, effectively blocking his access to the door. Mr. Mabe 
1. Tr.l refers to the transcript of the January 4, 1991 
interrogation. Tr.2 refers to the transcript of the January 7, 1991 
interview. Videotapes of the two interrogations are also part of 
the record on appeal. The transcripts of the interrogations were 
submitted to facilitate review by the trial court and this Court. 
R. 93 is the entire transcript of the hearing on the motion to 
suppress which was held May 20, 1991. 
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was subjected to nearly three hours of questioning. Near the end of 
the interrogation, Mr. Mabe was left alone in the room for 
approximately ten minutes to "think.11 Tr.l pp. 95-96. At no time 
was Mr. Mabe informed of his Miranda rights, provided with drink or 
use of the restroom. Videotape 1. Comments of the detectives 
indicated that Mr. Mabe, an alcoholic, had been drinking prior to 
the interrogation. Tr.l pp. 47, 48, 51, 81. 
During the course of the interrogation, Mr. Mabe repeatedly 
informed the detectives that he no longer wished to talk to them 
and, at one point, asked if he was free to leave.2 Tr.l pp. 29, 34, 
44-5, 48, 71, 77, 85. The detectives did not terminate the 
questioning in response to Mr. Mabe's statements. Approximately one 
hour into the interview, Detective Oliver informed Mr. Mabe that 
Mr. Mabe was the principal suspect. Tr.l p. 1. 
The detectives implied that Mr. Mabe could "work this out" 
as he had done in the "Brinks Deal."3 During the hearing, the 
2. Illustrative of such statements by Mr. Mabe are the following: 
Mabe: You know, if you're just goin' sit here 
and harass me, no offense, but that's all you're 
doing right now, is harassing me, I'm not saying 
another word. I mean I'm just tired of hearin' 
that. I did not kill my wife! And I'm tired of 
hearing it! 
Tr.l p. 71. 
Mabe: I'm not admitting to it 'cause I didn't do 
it. And I'm not saying nothing else. I don't 
appreciate this at all. 
Tr.l p. 77. 
3. Footnote on next page. 
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detectives acknowledged that they knew that Mr. Mabe had been 
sentenced to probation on the Brinks matter and that a theft is 
treated very differently from a homicide. R. 32, 36, 93. During 
the initial interrogation, the detectives articulated promises of 
leniency on several occasions.4 They also implied threats of 
3. Mr. Mabe was involved in a theft from his employer, the Brinks 
Company, in 1985. That felony charge was resolved when Mr. Mabe 
reported to the police on his own volition, and as a result of a 
plea agreement, Mr. Mabe received probation. Mr. Mabe was 
incarcerated less than five days for that conviction. S. 5, 43; 
R. 93 pp. 31-3. 
4. The following are examples of the officers' suggestions of 
leniency: 
Detective Oliver: Okay, just like the Brinks 
deal. We're here to help you and we're willing 
to help you, okay? 
Tr.l p. 26. 
Detective Oliver: At Brinks you accepted the 
responsibility and things worked out for you. 
Tr.l p. 38. 
Detective Oliver: You had the man in you to fess 
up to that [the Brinks theft] and things worked 
out for you. Things can work out here, too, Gary. 
Tr.l p. 56, 
Detective Oliver: . . . Do you feel you did the 
right thing on the Brinks deal? Would you do it 
any different if you had another out of it? 
Things worked out for you right? 
Mabe: Yeah. 
Detective Oliver: Well, I think things could 
work out for you again if you'll tell us the 
truth. 
Tr.l pp. 18-19. 
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harsher charges if Mr. Mabe did not confess. Tr.l pp. 18, 21, 26, 
38, 40, 42, 56, 86, 90, 91, 97.5 
5. The following statements are illustrative of the promises/ 
threats stated during the course of the Friday interrogation: 
Detective Oliver: . . . If [Detective Johnson] 
gets one little piece of evidence, you know, he's 
going to go to the District Attorney and say 
"I've been working on this for two years. I 
finally got that SOB and now I'm going to charge 
him," where now, today, if we can take care of it 
today, we can help you and we want to help you, 
okay? 
Tr.l p. 39. Detective Oliver then reiterated that Detective Johnson 
would not have the same feelings if he had to work two years to 
break the case. 
Detective Oliver: I want to help you . . . make 
it as easy on you as possible. I want to do that 
right now, Gary, but you know, [Detective 
Johnson] wants to do it. The kids want to do 
it. You've got a lot of support, Gary, but if 
you're going to rebuff that, you're going to buck 
that support, we can't help you Gary, you know, 
and we want to help you . . . But now's the time 
to let us help you, 'cause you know, a year from 
now or two years from now, we're not going to be 
able to help you. 
Tr.l p. 42. 
Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you 
if the degree of the crime we charges with charge 
you with weighs a bit on what you tell us, how 
you cooperate with us. You know if it takes me a 
year, two years, whatever I'm going to solve this 
sucker. 
Mabe: I understand. 
Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you, 
if it's the hard way, I mean I'm going to sock it 
to you. 
Tr.l p. 56. 
(continued) 
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Throughout the interview, Mr. Mabe denied any involvement 
or knowledge of his wife's death. At the termination of the 
interrogation, Detective Johnson stated, "Like I say were not going 
to forget this, think about it. Then get ready to clear your 
conscience, call us (inaudible) if you need some help." Tr.l p. 98. 
After returning home from the interrogation, Mr. Mabe 
attempted to call the detectives; however, dispatch refused to 
contact them because they were off duty. R. 93 pp. 11-12. Mr. Mabe 
(footnote 5 continued) 
Detective Oliver: I can understand the drinking, 
you know, most people have a drink, but you know, 
most people will understand the drinking part of 
it cause, you know, it's a grieving part, you 
know. What if that jury doesn't buy your story? 
You know what your only chance is going to be 
then if they convict you is Johnny (Detective 
Johnson) because he is the case manager. He can 
say you know what? That guy came forward on 
January 4 and said ya I did it. 
Tr.l p. 57. 
Detective Oliver: We're your only salvation, you 
know. I'd much rather have me and John on your 
side than five people or eight people, or how 
ever many they use nowadays, they pick off the 
street. Plus that's making a recommendation 
saying that on January 4, 1991 . . . . 
Detective Johnson: Get it cleared up and make it 
easy for all of us. 
Tr.l p. 86. 
Detective Oliver: If we have to charge you with 
second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or 
something then, you know, we're going to have to 
do what we have to do as you're doing what you 
have to do. 
Tr.l p. 97. 
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attempted suicide three times over the course of the weekend with 
the use of drugs, alcohol and natural gas poisoning.6 Tr.2 
pp. 16-17. 
On Monday morning, January 7, 1991, Mr. Mabe phoned the 
detectives and left a message for them to call him at his home. 
S-3, R. 93 p. 9. The detectives then picked up Mr. Mabe at his West 
Valley home and returned him to the Public Safety Building. In 
contrast to the Friday interrogation, the detectives read Mr. Mabe 
the Miranda warning, Mr. Mabe was smoking a cigarette, he had a 
drink, and he was seated on the side of the table with neither 
detective blocking his access to the door; he was also allowed to 
use the restroom and contact his brother. Videotape 2. Mr. Mabe 
provided the detectives with a statement detailing his involvement 
in the death of Carol Mabe. Tr.2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The totality of the circumstances in this case establishes 
that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the State had 
sustained its burden of establishing the voluntariness of the 
statement. During the Friday interrogation, the officers made 
implied promises of lenient treatment, comparing the Brinks matter 
in which Appellant had been placed on probation with the instant 
6. On Saturday, Mr. Mabe attempted suicide by taking a bottle of 
over-the-counter medication. On Sunday, he ingested two bottles of 
over-the-counter medication with a six pack of beer. Finally, on 
Sunday night, Mr. Mabe reversed the vent on the furnace into the 
house. Tr.2 pp. 16-17. 
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matter, and indicating that "things could work out for [him] again" 
if he were to "fess up" and accept responsibility. The officers 
also threatened to file more severe charges if he did not "fess up." 
These promises and threats were coupled with the fact that 
the detectives did not mirandize Mr, Mabe during the initial 
interrogation even though he was a suspect and not free to leave 
during that interrogation. In addition, Appellant's precarious 
mental and emotional state, including the fact that he was grieving 
over the loss of his wife, attempted suicide during the weekend 
between the two interviews, and was an alcoholic who was drinking, 
contributed to the lack of voluntariness. 
The passage of seventy-two hours was not sufficient to 
purge the taint of the earlier interrogation. The threats and 
promises and the implication that things would go easier for 
Mr. Mabe if he were to confess then rather than being charged two 
years later after the detectives had been made to work hard for the 
case carried over throughout the weekend and into the second 
interrogation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. MR. MABE'S JANUARY 7. 1991 STATEMENT WAS NOT 
VOLUNTARY. 
"Certain interrogation techniques . . . are so offensive to 
a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned . . . ." 
Miller v. Fenton. 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 
(1985). As a result, confessions obtained through the use of 
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coercive techniques violate an individual's fifth and fourteenth 
amendment rights against self-incrimination and due process of law 
and therefore are not admissible into evidence. State v. Griffin. 
754 P.2d 965, 971 (Utah App. 1988); Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 
157, 163, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); State v. Watts. 639 
P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981). 
The United States Supreme Court has articulated the 
underlying rationale for this rule of law: 
The abhorrence of society to the use of 
involuntary confessions does not turn alone on 
the inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on 
the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey 
the law while enforcing the law; that in the end 
life and liberty can be as much endangered from 
illegal methods used to convict those thought to 
be criminals as from the actual criminals 
themselves. 
Soano v. New York. 360 U.S. 315, 320-1, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 
1265 (1959). 
The threshold determination is whether Mr. Mabe's Monday, 
January 7, statement was "essentially [the] free and unconstrained 
choice [of] its maker." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 
226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 862 (1973). The focus is on whether 
the defendant's will was overcome so as to "induce [him] to talk 
when he otherwise would not have done so." State v. Griffin. 754 
P.2d at 971, quoting State v. Heaelman. 717 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 
1986). Such a determination is to be based on the totality of the 
circumstances, including the characteristics of the individual and 
the details of the interrogation. Id. at 226; State v. Strain. 779 
P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989); State v. Heaelman. 717 P.2d 1348, 1350 
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(Utah 1986); State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991). The State bears the burden 
of demonstrating the voluntariness of the confession by a 
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1988). 
Coercion need not come in the form of brutal beatings or 
prolonged deprivation; subtle psychological coercion is often a much 
more effective technique, yet no less abhorrent a method of 
obtaining a confession. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 
1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959); see also United States v. Tingle, 658 
F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Mr. Mabe was subject to a " . . . psychological force or 
manipulation . . . designed to induce [him] to talk when he 
otherwise would not have done so." State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348 
(Utah 1986); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 
515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). This psychological force was the result 
of the combined effect of the detectives' promises of leniency and 
threats of harsher treatment, an unmirandized custodial 
interrogation, and manipulation of Mr. Mabe's emotional state. 
A. PROMISES AND THREATS MADE BY THE DETECTIVES 
SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERALL COERCIVE 
EFFECT OF THE FRIDAY INTERROGATION. 
"In order for a confession to be admissible, it must be 
made freely and voluntarily, it must not be extracted by threats or 
violence or obtained by improper influence or promises." State v. 
Watts, 639 P.2d at 160; State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 
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1988); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986); State v. Moore, 
697 P.2d at 236; State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989). This is 
not an absolute rule but rather one of the elements to be considered 
in the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding a confession. 
Strain, 779 P.2d at 227. 
The importance of promises of leniency and threats of 
harsher treatment in the totality of the circumstances was addressed 
in Bradv v. United States. 397 U.S. 742, 754, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 
L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). In Bradv. the United States Supreme Court held 
that confessions obtained by misrepresentation of promises of 
leniency are not per se involuntary if the effect of interrogation 
tactics is "dissipated by the presence and advice of counsel." 
However, where a confession is taken from an unrepresented suspect 
in custody, "even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient 
to bar the confession, not because the promise was an illegal act as 
such, but because defendants at such times are too sensitive to 
inducement and the possible impact on them too great to ignore and 
too difficult to assess." Id. at 754. 
In State v. Strain, 779 P.2d at 226, this Court recognized 
that "most courts have found a confession involuntary where a threat 
to pursue a higher charge if the accused did not confess, or a 
promise to pursue a lesser charge if he did confess, was 
exhortative. [citations omitted]." The defendant in Strain 
confessed to the murder of his step-daughter after promises and 
threats by a detective. In the interrogation at issue in that case, 
the defendant was informed of his rights, after which the detective 
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made statements that if the defendant confessed, he would only be 
charged with second degree murder, but if he did not confess, he 
would be charged with first degree murder and face possible 
execution. The Utah Supreme Court held the detective's statements 
to be "impermissibly coercive because they carried a threat of 
greater punishment or a promise for a lesser punishment depending on 
whether he confessed." 
In the present case, the detectives repeatedly suggested 
that Mr. Mabe would receive more lenient treatment if he confessed 
and that he would be treated more harshly if he did not make a 
statement. The suggestion of more lenient treatment was often made 
by comparing the situation to the Brinks matter and implying that 
Mr. Mabe would receive treatment similar to that which he received 
in the Brinks matter if he were to confess. Tr.l pp. 18-19, 26, 38, 
56. Examples of such suggestions of more lenient treatment if he 
were to confess include the following: 
Detective Oliver: . . . Do you feel you did the 
right thing on the Brinks deal? Would you do it 
any different if you had another out of it? 
Things worked out for you right? 
Mabe: Yeah. 
Detective Oliver: Well, I think things could 
work out for you again if you'll tell us the 
truth. 
Tr.l pp. 18-19. 
Detective Oliver: Okay, just like the Brinks 
deal. We're here to help you and we're willing 
to help you, okay? 
Tr.l p. 26. 
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Detective Oliver: At Brinks you accepted the 
responsibility and things worked out for you. 
Tr.l p. 38. 
Detective Oliver: You had the man in you to fess 
up to that [the Brinks theft] and things worked 
out for you. Things can work out here, too, Gary. 
Tr.l p. 56. 
Even though the detectives knew that Mr. Mabe had received 
probation on the Brinks theft and that theft cases are treated in a 
markedly different manner than homicide cases without probation as 
an option (R. 93 pp. 32, 36), they implied that things would work 
out similarly if he were to confess. 
The detectives also repeatedly threatened harsher 
treatment, including more severe charges, if Mr. Mabe did not 
confess. Examples of such threats include the following: 
Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you 
if the degree of the crime we charges with charge 
you with weighs a bit on what you tell us, how 
you cooperate with us. You know if it takes me 
one year, two years, whatever I'm going to solve 
this sucker. 
Mabe: I understand. 
Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you, 
if it's the hard way, I mean I'm going to sock it 
to you. 
Tr.l p. 56. 
Detective Oliver: If we have to charge you with 
second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or 
something then, you know, we're going to have to 
do what we have to do as you're doing what you 
have to do. 
Tr.l p. 97. 
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The trial court found that "during the interview there were 
suggestions that the defendant may be charged with a more serious 
offense should he refuse to cooperate and that there might be more 
lenient treatment should he cooperate." R. 67, 68. This finding 
appropriately reflects the totality of the interrogation. 
In State v. Miller. 829 P.2d 131, 134 (Utah App. 1992), a 
panel of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that threats of greater 
charges and promises of leniency have been found to be coercive. 
Threats of possibly greater charges were found to 
be coercive in State v. Rhiner. 352 N.W.2d 258, 
262-64 (Iowa 1984) (defendant coercively told "he 
might be in jeopardy on other charges unless he 
cooperated"). Promises of leniency have also 
been found to be a coercive factor. United 
States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 
1981) ("promise to seek lenient treatment" is 
evidence of coercion).7 
See also State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988) ("In order 
for a confession to be admissible, it must be made freely and 
7. The Miller Court determined that under the totality of 
circumstances, Miller's confession was not involuntary because "the 
characteristics of the accused" outweigh any potentially coercive 
"details of the interrogation." Miller, 829 P.2d at 135. In 
Miller, the defendant had extensive involvement in the criminal 
justice system, since he had been to prison twice, jailed four 
times, and has had some fifteen encounters with police." Id. 
Miller was familiar with interrogation techniques, participated 
actively and intelligently in the interrogation process, "and may 
have actually initiated and solicited the promise to recommend more 
lenient treatment." Id. 
By contrast, Mr. Mabe had only one prior experience with 
the criminal justice system which resulted in him being placed on 
probation for a fairly serious charge after he cooperated with 
officials. Although he had some college education, his prior 
experience negates any argument that as an intelligent man, he acted 
voluntarily. Mr. Mabe was also in a precarious emotional state due 
to the death of his wife and his battle with alcoholism. Unlike the 
situation in Miller, the officers preyed on this precarious 
emotional state during the first interrogation. 
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voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats or violence or 
obtained by improper influence or promises. [citation omitted].11); 
State v. Burr, 615 P.2d 635, 637 (Ariz. 1980) (officer's statement 
implying benefit in exchange for information requires suppression). 
The repeated reference to the "Brinks deal" by the 
detectives and implication that this matter could be resolved in a 
like manner created an implied promise that if Mr. Mabe confessed, 
the charges could be resolved without a prison term or, at the 
least, a minimal sentence. This implied promise coupled with 
threats to charge a more severe crime if he did not confess worked 
together to induce the statement given in this case. 
Additionally, the detective's suggestion that Mr. Mabe may 
not be guilty because the death of his wife may have been a crime of 
passion or rage implied that a reduced charge may been appropriate 
if Mr. Mabe confessed. Tr.l pp. 26, 38, 96. The detectives made 
misrepresentations that they had sufficient evidence to present the 
case to the County Attorney, in spite of the fact that they had only 
minimal circumstantial evidence. Tr.l pp. 89, 94. Detective 
Johnson testified at the motion hearing that at the time of the 
confession, they lacked sufficient evidence to charge Mr. Mabe. 
R. 29, 93. Such misrepresentations by the government resulted in 
Mr. Mabe being mislead concerning the consequences of his 
confession. The effect of such a misrepresentation is that "his 
statement was unconstitutionally induced by a prohibited direct or 
implied promise." United States v. Goldstein, 611 F.Supp. 626, 632 
(D.C. 111. 1985). See also Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409, 411-14 
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(4th Cir. 1968); Soano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 79 
S.Ct. 1202 (1959). 
In the present case, the detectives' statements are 
particularly egregious and coercive considering they were presented 
to Mr. Mabe without the benefit of the Miranda warning or advice of 
counsel. See discussion infra at 17-19. 
B. THE ABSENCE OF MIRANDA WARNINGS AT INITIAL 
INTERROGATION CONTRIBUTED TO COERCION. 
Failure to give Miranda warnings in a custodial 
interrogation creates a presumption of coercion. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
However, the question of when custody begins is "murky and 
difficult." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 
L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). 
In assessing whether an individual was in custody, the 
initial inquiry is whether a "reasonable person" would believe he or 
she was free to leave. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 
S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 
1104 (Utah App. 1990). 
This Court has articulated the following factors to be 
considered in determining whether an individual is in custody: 
(1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation 
focused on the accused, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest 
were present, and (4) the length and form of interrogation. Salt 
Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983); see also 
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State v, Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Utah App. 1990). 
The district court's finding in the present case that 
"[d]uring the interview the defendant was never involuntarily 
detained or arrested" is not supported by the facts and is clearly 
erroneous• R. 67. 
During the initial interrogation, a reasonable person under 
the circumstances would have believed s/he was not free to leave. 
First, the initial interrogation occurred in an interrogation room 
at the police station.8 Although Mr. Mabe reported to the police 
station at the request of the detectives, that fact "does not mean 
that he was free to leave during the entire remainder of the 
interrogation." Sampson. 808 P.2d at 1105. On the contrary, the 
detectives did not let Mr. Mabe leave when he desired to do so. 
Mabe: Are you going to continue to hold me? 
Detective Oliver: Poor Gary, poor Gary. 
Mabe: I mean we can sit here and rehash this 
thing over and over and over . . . 
Detective Oliver: We might. We might 'til we 
get some straight answers from you. 
. . . 
Mabe: I just see no reason to sit here and 
rehash the same thing over and over and over. 
Tr.l pp. 44-45. 
8. Mr. Mabe expressed his reaction to the detectives as follows: 
Mabe: I guess sometimes your authority 
intimidates me as much as it does anybody else. 
Tr.l p. 82. 
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Second, the investigation had focused on Mr, Mabe. Early 
in the interrogation, the detectives clearly stated that they 
believed that Mr. Mabe had caused the death of his wife. Tr.l 
p. 10.9 When investigatory questioning becomes accusatory, as is 
the case in the interrogation of Mr. Mabe, "custody is likely." 
Sampson. 808 P.2d at 1105; earner, 664 P.2d at 1170. 
In addition to the officers' verbal refusal to terminate 
the interrogation, the layout of the interrogation also demonstrates 
that Mr. Mabe was in custody. Mr. Mabe was seated at the end of the 
room farthest from the door with an officer on either side of him, 
blocking his exit to the door. 
Finally, the length and form of the interrogation 
demonstrate that Mr. Mabe was in custody. The detectives repeatedly 
referred to potential charges and evidence suggesting that Mr. Mabe 
had committed the homicide. Tr.l p. 8. They also informed him that 
he had been "extremely deceptive" at the polygraph examination. 
Tr.l p. 9. Over the course of nearly three hours, Mr. Mabe 
repeatedly stated that he did not wish to talk further with the 
officers; yet, they persisted in their badgering and interrogation. 
9. The following is one of several of the detectives' accusatory 
statements: 
Johnson: . . . just nothing, nothing else fits. 
It points to you. 
Tr.l p. 10. 
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C. MR. MABE'S MENTAL CONDITION CONTRIBUTED TO 
THE COERCIVE NATURE OF THE INTERROGATION. 
In determining the "totality of the circumstances" 
surrounding the voluntariness of a confession, the "characteristics 
of the accused" must be considered as well as the "details of the 
interrogation." Strain. 779 P.2d at 225. Mr. Mabe does not contest 
the court's finding that he was "38 years old and appear[ed] in good 
health/1 that "he appeared to be lucid and in full control of his 
faculties" and that he has some college education and an I.Q. of 
127," or that he "had previously entered a guilty plea to the 
commission of a felony." R. 167. However, his emotional and mental 
condition combined with the overall circumstance of the Friday 
interrogation contributed to the coercive effect of the 
interrogation and a continuation of that effect throughout the 
weekend. See United States v. Gordon. 638 F.Supp. 1120 (W.D. La. 
1986), cited in Bishop. 753 P.2d at 464, n.75. These circumstances 
combined mitigated the effects of Mr. Mabe's health, intelligence 
and prior knowledge of the criminal system. 
Mr. Mabe is a recovered alcoholic, who admitted to drinking 
during the month following his wife's death and immediately prior to 
coming to the police station. The detectives noted in the 
interrogation that they could smell alcohol and that they suspected 
that Mr. Mabe had been drinking. Tr.l pp. 47, 48, 51, 52, 84. In 
United States v. Rohrbach. 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied. 482 U.S. 909 (1987), the court held a history of alcohol 
abuse "would be relevant to the voluntariness issue." Id. at 144. 
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The effects of Mr. Mabe's alcohol abuse increased his susceptibility 
to coercion. This abuse is indicative of his dependent personality, 
which the officers frequently made reference to in the 
interrogation. Tr.l pp. 3, 73/ 74, 97. Officers also repeatedly 
brought up Mr. Mabe's history of alcoholism and preyed on his 
feelings about his drinking, e.g. Tr. 1, pp. 3, 4, 8, 10, 14, 20, 
23, 24, 25. 
Mr. Mabe's mental condition was further weakened by the 
fact that he was grieving over the loss of his wife and had 
considerable financial difficulty. Mr. Mabe was not working at the 
time of the interview and was responsible for a large debt for back 
child support. Tr.l pp. 3, 77. The trial judge recognized the 
emotional strain Mr. Mabe was operating under in finding that 
Mr. Mabe indicated he had made suicide attempts over the weekend and 
made emotional displays during the January 7 interview, both of 
which were consistent with remorsefulness and sorrow. R. 68. All 
of these factors contributed to tremendous stress and emotional 
instability in Mr. Mabe, who had been dependent upon his wife 
financially and emotionally. 
Mr. Mabe's mental condition, including the extreme stress 
he was under and a history of alcoholism, is "a more significant 
factor" in determining voluntariness because of the subtle 
psychological coercion employed by the detectives. Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 107 S.Ct. 515 (1986). 
Unlike the situation in State v. Miller. 829 P.2d at 135, 
Mr. Mabe's prior experience with the criminal justice system did not 
- 21 -
outweigh the effect of the threats and promises. Mr. Mabe had less 
experience with the criminal justice system than did the defendant 
in Miller, and Mr. Mabe's only experience had resulted in probation 
when he cooperated. 
The overall impact of the first interview was to 
communicate to Mr. Mabe that he would be treated more harshly if he 
did not confess and given lenient treatment if he did. These 
threats and promises coupled with Mr. Mabe's characteristics 
demonstrate the coerciveness of that interview. 
D. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHES 
THAT MR. MABE'S STATEMENT WAS INVOLUNTARY. 
The characteristics of the accused in this case were his 
emotional instability, dependence, sorrow, and feelings of remorse 
coupled with his history of alcoholism. These were coupled with his 
prior experience with the criminal justice system wherein he was 
placed on probation for a fairly serious theft charge because of his 
cooperation and voluntary statements. 
The details of the first interrogation include repeated 
implied promises of lenient treatment if he were to make a 
statement, coupled with threats of harsher charges if he did not 
confess, and no Miranda warnings. The totality of these 
circumstances establishes the involuntariness of the statement. 
E. MR. MABE'S MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1991, 
STATEMENTS WERE TAINTED BY THE COERCIVE EFFECTS 
OF FRIDAYS INTERROGATION. 
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Mr. Mabe did not make a statement during the course of the 
coercive January 4 interrogation; rather, he contacted the 
detectives on the following Monday morning and made a statement to 
them after they read him the Miranda warning. Neither the passage 
of time nor the reading of the Miranda warning sufficiently purged 
the taint of the coercive effects of the Friday interrogation. 
Mr. Mabe's Monday statements were the direct result and continuing 
effect of that interrogation and the detectives' coercive techniques. 
Justice Powell has articulated the rationale for the 
dissipation of the taint doctrine. 
. . . the notion of the "dissipation of the 
taint" attempts to mark the point at which the 
detrimental consequences of illegal police action 
becomes so attenuated that the deterrent effect 
of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its 
cost. 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 
(1975). Powell, J. Concurring, Rehnquist, J. The following 
factors are to be considered when making such a determination: 
(a) temporal proximity of the primary illegality, (b) the presence 
or absence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and 
flagrance of the illegal police conduct. Id. at 603-4. See also 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the effects 
of coercion can be purged with the passage of time. Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 105 S.Ct. 1285 
(1985). See also United States v. Chalan. 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 
1987) . However, the facts of the case are not such that seventy-two 
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hours was not sufficient time to purge the taint of the detectives' 
coercive interrogation. The interrogation ended with a suggestion 
that Mr. Mabe could still benefit if he were to call. Tr.l p. 98. 
Mr. Mabe's phone call to the detectives on Friday night, his 
distressed emotional state, and his repeated suicide attempts (all 
involving substances which could have impaired his mental 
functioning) are indicative of a continuing effect of the 
detectives' coercive threats and promises. Throughout the weekend, 
Mr. Mabe focused on the coercive interrogation without the benefit 
of being informed of his right to counsel and against 
self-incrimination. 
The only potentially intervening event, aside from the 
passage of time, between the coercive interrogation and Mr. Mabe's 
incriminating statement was the reading of the Miranda warning to 
Mr. Mabe on Monday morning immediately proceeding his confession. 
The Unites States Supreme Court has held that the Miranda warning 
following an illegality on the part of the officers may not overcome 
the taint of the illegality. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 
686, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988); Brown v. Illinois. 422 
U.S. 590 ("Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make [a 
confession] sufficiently a product of free will to break . . . the 
causal connection between [all illegal arrest] and the 
confession.11) . 1 0 
10. See also State v. Williams. 249 S.E.2d 758 (1978) ("fact that 
Miranda warnings were given prior to each confession is not 
sufficient standing alone to purge the primary taint"). 
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In the present case, the reading of the Miranda rights was 
"merely a formalizing . . . of what has already taken place." 
Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J.r dissenting). 
Justice Brennan goes on to cite the following persuasive reasoning, 
"[t]he giving of the miranda warnings before reducing the product of 
the day's work to written form could not undo what had been done or 
make legal what was illegal." Id. at 330, quoting People v. Bodner, 
75 App. Div.2d 440, 448, 430 N.Y.S.2d 433, 438 (1980). The mere 
reading of the Miranda warning after the continuing effects of the 
coercive interrogation had already overborne Mr. Mabe's free will 
did not undo the coercive, continuing effects of the first 
interrogation. Mr. Mabe was still left with the impression that he 
would be charged less harshly and receive lenient treatment if he 
confessed. 
Finally, the court must consider the purpose or flagrancy 
of the officers' conduct. The detectives' purpose in coercing a 
statement from Mr. Mabe may have been well intentioned; however, the 
public's interest in solving a crime cannot be gained at the expense 
of an individual's constitutional right to be free from coercive 
tactics. The detectives interrogated and accused Mr. Mabe of his 
wife's murder for almost three hours in an unmirandized custodial 
setting. They made misrepresentations, promises and threats in an 
effort to obtain a confession from Mr. Mabe. The flagrancy of the 
police conduct in making such threats and promises, even though they 
knew a homicide would ultimately be treated much differently than a 
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theft, demonstrates that the taint of the first interview was not 
dissipated at the time Mr. Mabe made his statement. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Gary Lee Mabe, respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's denial of the Motion to Suppress and 
remand this case for trial absent the coerced confession. 
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ADDENDUM A 
LYNN R. BROWN 
KIMBERLY CLARK 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ^ UD/ICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, 
v. : 
GARY LEE MABE, : Case No. 911000272FS 
Defendant. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Gary Mabe urges the Court to suppress statements taken from 
him by Salt Lake City Police Officers because those statements were 
involuntary. The involuntariness of statements taken from Mr. Mabe 
is manifest from the totality circumstances under which they were 
taken. Promises were made to Mr. Mabe by Detectives John Johnson 
and Chuck Oliver to induce a confession. In addition, these 
promises gave the clear suggestion that Mr. Mabe would help himself, 
that is, qualify for lenient treatment, if he would confess his 
involvement in the crime being investigated. Mr. Mabe was lead to 
believe, and virtually assured, that he would never be in the 
situation he is in today, if he implicated himself in this crime. 
RUB DISTRICT C9WT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 3 1991 
OUNTY 
The appeal of these promises of leniency was enhanced by 
the fact that the detectives knew Mr, Mabe had been involved in the 
criminal justice system on a previous occasion, that he had 
confessed to a felony and received probation. Detective Oliver told 
Mr. Mabe that this charge was "just like the Brinks deal. We're 
willing to help you, okay?" Transcript of videotape, January 4, 
1991, hereinafter (T. 26). "Uh things worked out on that Brinks 
deal, you were smart enough to say, hey, I made a mistake." (T. 
42). "You had the man in you to fess up to that and things worked 
out for you. Things can work out here too, Gary." (T. 56). 
In addition to the promises of leniency, Mr. Mabefs 
statements were extracted through threats made by Detective 
Johnson. Detective Johnson told Mr. Mabe if he did not confess, he 
would be treated with much greater severity. His suggestion was 
that if it took him one or two years to solve the case he would be 
harsher. Detective Oliver told Mr. Mabe, "If we have to charge you 
with second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or something 
then, you know, we're going to have to do what we have to do as 
you're doing what you have to do." (T. 97). 
The promises and threats made to Mr. Mabe must be viewed in 
the context of the totality of the circumstances of the 
interrogation. Mr. Mabe's physical and mental condition must be 
considered. In addition, the length and nature of the interrogation 
must be considered. The circumstances, viewed in their totality, 
demonstrate an interrogation which produced statements that were 
legally involuntary. For this reason, these statements must be 
suppressed. 
^ :•':•:: 7 3 
-2 -
II. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
On December 5, 1990, in the morning hours, the body of 
Carol Mabe was discovered at her place of employment, Timesaver 
Industrial, Inc. She was found by a fellow employee at about 
7:00 a.m. 
On January 4, 1991, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Gary Mabe, 
the victim's husband, was asked by Detectives John Johnson and Chuck 
Oliver to meet them at the Public Safety Building for an interview. 
The initial portion of the videotaped interview involved questions 
about what Mr. Mabe remembered about the morning his wife was 
killed. After some time, Mr. Mabe was informed by Detective Oliver 
that they believed he had killed his wife. Several times during the 
interrogation Mr. Mabe told the detectives that he no longer wished 
to talk to them. (T. 48, 71, 85) The officers continued to press 
Mr. Mabe about his involvement in his wife's death. 
Through out the interrogation, Mr. Mabe denied any 
involvement in or knowledge about his wife's death. After several 
hours of interrogation, Mr. Mabe asked if he was free to leave, (T. 
98) then got up and left. 
During the weekend, Mr. Mabe attempted suicide three 
times. First he took a bottle of over-the-counter medication, but 
awoke the next day. Second, on Sunday he took two bottles of 
over-the-counter medication with a six pack of beer. Third, he 
vented the furnace into the house on Sunday night and woke up 
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gagging and choking. Monday morning, January 7, 1991, Mr. Mabe 
returned to the Public Safety Building and made the statements, he 
is asking the court to suppress. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
1. STATEMENTS MADE BY A SUSPECT TO AGENTS OP THE 
STATE MUST BE SUPPRESSED IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THEIR PRODUCTION, INCLUDING PROMISES OR 
THREATS MADE BY AGENTS OF THE STATE, 
DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE INVOLUNTARY. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution prohibit the use of statements involuntarily obtained 
from the accused. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). Once the 
accused challenges the voluntariness of his statements, the State 
bears the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary by a 
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1988). 
The test for voluntariness was established by the United 
States Supreme Court in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
There the Court said: 
"But a confession, in order to be 
admissible...must not be extracted by any sort of 
threat of violence, nor obtained by any direct or 
implied promises, however slight, nor by the 
exertion of any improper influence.. . " 
Id. at 542-42. 
Although Bram still retains validity, the courts have since 
held that there is no automatic rule mandating the suppression of 
all incriminating statements obtained by promissory inducement. In 
United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 
389 0.8.908(1967), the court stated that the clear test of 
voluntariness is "whether an examination of all the circumstances 
discloses that the conduct of law enforcement was such as to over 
bear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions 
not freely self-determined." Jjd. at 17. 
In situations where the defendant is in custody and without 
counsel, Bram is strictly construed. In United States v. Fraction, 
613 F.Supp. 295 (D.C.N.J. 1985), the district court held that "a 
custodial setting is highly relevant to determine how literally Bram 
should be read." Also in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 
(1970), the court held that confessions obtained by 
misrepresentation of promises of leniency are not per se involuntary 
if the effect of interrogation tactics is "dissipated by the 
presence and advice of counsel." However, where a confession is 
taken from an unrepresented suspect in custody, "even a mild promise 
of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because 
the promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at 
such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible impact 
on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess." _ld. at 
754. 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the 
United States Supreme Court reiterated what it termed the "ultimate 
test" of voluntariness as first applied in Culombe v. Connecticut, 
376 U.S. 568 (1961): 
"Is the confession the product of an essentially 
free and unconstrained choice by its maker? . . . 
If it is not, if his will has been overborne and 
his capacity of self-determination critically 
impaired, the use of his confession offends due 
process." 
Id. at 225-6. 
Determining the voluntariness of a confession requires the 
court to consider the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the interrogation. Schneckloth at 226, cited with 
approval in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) and State v. 
Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986). In United States v. Shears, 
762 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1985), the circuit court held that government 
agents may initiate conversations on cooperation, may promise to 
make defendant's cooperation known to the prosecution and may even 
be able to make and breech certain promises without rendering a 
resulting confession involuntary, but an important factor in 
determining the voluntariness of a defendant's confession is his 
perception of what the agents have promised. 
The Utah Supreme Court has provided a test for 
voluntariness similar to those elucidated above. In State v. Moore, 
697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985), the court held that to support a finding 
that a confession is involuntary, the evidence must reveal some 
"physical or psychological force or manipulation that is designed to 
induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done 
so." 21• at 236* Similarly in United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 
1332 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held: 
A confession is involuntary whether coerced by 
physical or psychological pressure . . . Law 
enforcement conduct which renders a confession 
involuntary does not consist only of express 
threats so direct as to bludgeon a defendant into 
failure of the will. Subtle psychological 
coercion suffices as well, and at times more 
effectively, to overbear a rational intellect and 
a free will. 
\'* / * c t ^ "> 
-6 - ' -"'- ** 
2d at 1335. 
2. STATEMENTS TAKEN FROM GARY MABE BY AGENTS OF 
THE STATE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY 
WERE INDUCED BY PROMISES WHICH WITHIN THE 
TOTALITY OF THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INTERROGATION, AMOUNTED 
TO IMPERMISSIBLE MANIPULATION. 
In the case at bar, GARY MABE was subjected to physical and 
psychological force which was designed to induce him to make 
statements which he was not otherwise disposed to give. This type 
of manipulation is proscribed in numerous cases cited above. During 
the interrogation, Mabe was suffering from the effects of the 
grieving process following the death of his wife coupled with the 
effects of drinking. (T. 48.) Detectives Jensen and Oliver took 
advantage of Mabe's impaired psychological and mental condition. 
During the several hours of interrogation, Detectives 
Jensen and Oliver continually referred to the "Brinks deal". (T. 16, 
18, 24-28, 38, 40, 42, 55, 65, 74, 76, 91, 92.) Both detectives 
were aware that Mr. Mabe had been charged with a felony theft 
several years ago and that he pleaded guilty to the charge after 
turning himself in. Additionally, they were aware that Mr. Mabe 
spent five (5) days in the Salt Lake County Jail and was ultimately 
placed on probation.. Both detectives knew that Mr. Mabe would not 
be placed on probation in this case, whether or not he admitted any 
involvement. However, Detective Oliver stated, "Uh, things worked 
out on that Brinks deal, you were smart enough to say, hey, I made a 
mistake." (T. 42.) He also stated, "You had the man in you to fess 
up to [the Brinks deal] and things worked out for you. Things can 
work out here too, Gary." (T. 56.) 
These statements created the implied promise to Mr. Mabe 
that his interests would be served by confessing in this matter as 
he did in the previous case and that he would receive the same 
treatment. Neither detective did anything to prevent Mr. Mabe from 
placing his trust in the misleading statements made. 
In United States v. Goldstein/ 611 F.Supp. 626 (D.C. 111. 
1985), the district court held, quoting from Grades v. Boles, 398 
F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1968), that "when the government misleads a 
suspect concerning the consequences of a confession, his statements 
are regarded as having been unconstitutionally induced by a 
prohibited direct or implied promise." Jjd. at 632. 
Because of the misrepresentations regarding the consequences of his 
confession and the implied promises of leniency, Mabe's 
incrimination statements should be considered involuntary and 
therefore inadmissible. 
3. STATEMENTS TAKEN FROM MABE BY AGENTS OF THE 
STATE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY WERE 
INDUCED BY A THREAT WHICH, WITHIN THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, RENDER THEM 
INVOLUNTARY. 
Although any interview of a suspect by police will have 
coercive aspects to it, the Utah Supreme Court has held in State v. 
Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981), that a confession "cannot be 
extracted by treats or violence or obtained by improper influences 
or promises and still be deemed to be voluntary." Ij3. at 160. 
Before Mabe showed any inclination toward confessing, 
Detective Oliver told him "If we have to charge you with second 
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degree homicide instead of manslaughter or something then, you know, 
we're going to have to do what we have to do, as you're doing what 
you have to do." (T. 97.) This type of threat was prohibited by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989). In 
that case the court held involuntary a confession where the accused 
was threatened with a more serious charge if he did not confess. In 
Strain, the interrogating detective gave the suspect the choice 
between confessing and receiving a charge of second degree murder, 
or not confessing and being charged with first degree murder. After 
examining the detective's statements, the court held that they were 
impermissibly coercive because "they carried the threat of greater 
punishment or a promise of lesser punishment contingent upon whether 
the defendant confessed." I£. at 226. 
In the case at bar, Oliver made clear the threat of greater 
punishment if Mabe did not confess: "If we have to charge you with 
second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or something, then, 
you know, we're going to have to do what we have to do, as you're 
doing what you have to do." (T. 97) that is, that Mr. Mabe would 
receive a lesser punishment as a reward for talking. These 
statements were made to Mr. Mabe moments before he left the Public 
Safety Building on Friday evening and although Mr. Mabe's confession 
was not extracted until the following Monday morning, that type of 
psychological force still invalidated the voluntariness of the 
confession. These threats, even if viewed as implied rather than 
express, are factors which invalidate the voluntariness of the 
confession and which, under the totality of the circumstances, 
mandate suppression. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Statefs burden is to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Mabe's confession was voluntary as viewed under 
the totality of the circumstances. The court must consider the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation. The germane considerations are the psychological and 
physical condition of Mr. Mabe; the grief over losing his wife, the 
effects of any alcohol use; the custodial setting; the absence of 
counsel; the promises made by Detective Oliver; and the threats 
which were made. The interrogation of Mr. Mabe violated the 
prohibitions against the use of psychological manipulation as set 
forth in Bram and its progeny. The interrogation violated the broad 
constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendments 
guarantee of fundamental fairness. Clearly Mabe initially was 
determined not to confess; his will to resist was systematically and 
consciously overborne by the strongarm and constitutionally 
unprotected tactics of Oliver and Jensen. It is true that Mr. Mabe 
did not confess until the following Monday, however, all of the 
coercion did not dissipate over the weekend. This court should 
enforce the position that important human values are sacrificed 
where agents of the government, in attempting to secure a 
conviction, bring a confession out of an accused against his will. 
Based on the forgoing, Gary Lee Mabe respectfully urges the court to 
suppress the statements made by him to his interrogators. 
-^. .a* 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21 day of May, 1991. 
LYNN R. BROWN 
''Attorney for Defendant 
KIMBERLY CLARK 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County 
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this day of May, 1991. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GARY LEE MABE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911900193FS 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress his confession in 
the above-captioned matter. A hearing on defendant's motion was 
held on May 20, 1991. The parties stipulated to the admission of 
State's exhibits one and two, which are video tapes of police 
interviews with the defendant. The first interview occurred on 
Friday, January 4, 1991. The second interview occurred on Monday, 
January 7, 1991. 
The Court has reviewed the video tapes of both 
interviews. The Court has reviewed the psychiatric evaluation of 
Dr. E. Alan Jeppsen and the memorandum submitted by both the 
defendant and the State. The Court has also reviewed the testimony 
of Detective John Johnson taken at the suppression hearing. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911900193FS 
Page two 
Based thereon, the Court makes the following Findings of 
Fact: 
1. On January 4, 1991, the defendant was interviewed 
at the Salt Lake City Police Department by detectives John Johnson 
and Chuck Oliver. The subject matter of this interview was the 
death of the defendant's wife, Carol Mabe, which occurred on 
December 5, 1990. This interview lasted between two and three 
hours. 
2. At the time of the interview the defendant was 38 
years old and appears to be in good health. During the interview 
he did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
The defendant appeared to be lucid and in full control of his 
faculties. He had attended Boise State College for three years and 
has an I.Q. of 127. The defendant had previously entered a guilty 
plea to the commission of a felony. 
3. During the interview the defendant was never 
involuntarily detained or arrested. The defendant left voluntarily 
at the end of the interview. The defendant was never physically 
threatened. He never asked for, or was refused the assistance of 
counsel. 
4. During the interview there were suggestions that 
the defendant may be charged with a more serious offense should he 
refuse to cooperate and that there might be more lenient treatment 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911900193FS 
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should he cooperate. However, the defendant made no incriminatory 
statements during the interview of January 4, 1991. 
5. On Monday, January 7, 1991, the defendant contacted 
Detective Johnson and requested that the detective come to his 
house and pick him up so that he could clear up the case. 
Detectives Johnson and Oliver picked up the defendant and 
transported him to the Salt Lake City Police Department. Nothing 
was said about the homicide during the trip. 
6. At the police station, Detective Johnson gave the 
defendant his Miranda warnings. The defendant clearly acknowledged 
the rights he was giving up and agreed to talk with the 
detectives. The defendant appeared to understand the questions put 
to him and was responsive. The defendant confessed to killing his 
wife. He did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs. The defendant appeared to understand what the consequences 
of his confession would be. 
7. The defendant indicated that he had made attempts 
at suicide over the weekend. This combined with his emotional 
displays during the January 7 interview are consistent with 
remorsefulness and sorrow for killing his wife on December 5, 1990. 
Conclusions of Law 
The Court has evaluated the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the defendant's confession. The Court finds that the 
^ 
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defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights under 
Miranda. The Court also finds that the defendant's confession was 
voluntary and not the result of coercion, threats or promises. 
The Court concludes that the State has met its burden of 
proof and orders that the defendant's Motion to Suppress be denied. 
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BY THE COURT: 
rRT JUDGE 
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